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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF U1'AH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vs-

"'\

· Case No.

ESTATE OF B. J. SILLIMAN, Deceased,
KENNETH SILLIMAN, Executor,
DefendantRespondent.

11,301

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the appellant under and pursuant to the laws of eminent domain to
acquire the property of respondent for public highway utilization.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Trial was held on the 28th and 29th day of
March and the 5th day of April, 1968, before the
Honorable Henry Ruggeri, I udge of the Seventh
Judicial District in and for Emery County, State of
Utah. Judgment of the court upon the general- ver-
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diet returned by the jury of eight was entered
against the appellant and in favor of the respondent
in the sum of $21.320. Appellant filed a Motion for
New Trial in which the tria] judge ordered a remittitur of $2,536 or a new trial. The respondent accepted the remittitur and a new trial was denied by
the trial court. The appellant thereupon prosecuted
this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's property which constitutes the
subject of the instant case is located west of the
Green River city limits, in Emery County, Utah. The
subject property affected consists of approximately
633. 70 acres. The subject property is vacant land
and unimproved, and is sparsely covered with
greasewood on rolling, rought terrain, broken up
with deep gullies and washes. At the time of acquisition, there was a dumpyard located on the subject property. The subject property has access to
U. S. Highway 50 and 6 and the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad right of way. The highway crosses the right of way by way of an underpass which is located approximately 2 Y2 miles from
the city of Green River. (Ex. P-1). The area acquired
by the appellant consists of 212.15 acres. In addition to the area taken in fee, the appellant acquired
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a. channel change easement in the amount of 7.1

acres and identified as Pa.reel No. 3:E. The remaining land consisted of 390.21 acres of which 130.48
acres were located north of the proposed improvement and 259.73 acres south of the proposed improvement. (Ex. P-1). The la.nd sought for public
highway utilization is identified as Parcel Nos. 3:A,
3:S, 6B, 6:A, 8:A, BB and 8G and is part of the continuation of the east-west interstate freeway I-70. The
proposed improvement to be located on the subject
property acquired is for an interchange with access
limitations. The interchange provides for an on and
off ramp to and from Green River, Utah. U. S. Highway 50 and 6 north of the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad easement will remain the same
with no limitation on access. After the acquisition by
the State, the subject property will have no access
to the south portion of the remaining property from
U. S. Highway 50 and 6. Access is acquired through
a county road located southeast of the interchange.
(Ex. P-7).
Matters relating to the power of the appellant
to condemn, public use and necessity of the highway project and the acquisition of respondent's
properties therefor, and location of the facilities in a
manner consonant with the greatest public good
and least private in)llfy were admitted by respondent, and the case was thereupon tried as to the issues of evaluation of the property to be expropriated, and damages, if any, by reason of severance,
less benefit accruinq, if any, by reason of construction of the highway. The date of taking was July 9,
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1966. The respondent's witnesses were Kenneth N.
Silliman, J. W. Hammond, Carl J. Leavitt. The State
called two expert witnesses, Memory Cain and Alden S. Adams. The specific evaluation estimates of
the witnesses were, respectively, as follows:
a. Silliman
1. Land taken ------------------------------- ___ $53,169.20
2. Severance damage to remaining
property ----------------------------· ___________ $12,487.50
3. Total opinion ______________________________ $65,656.70
b. Hammond
1. Land taken _______ -------·----- ______________ $41,747.20
2. Severance damage to remaining
property __ . ------·-------·-·----· ·····---···-$12,487.50
3. Total opinion ______ -------··-·--·-----·--__ $54,234.70
c. Leavitt
1. Land taken _______ --···---·--·--·-----·---- $41,747.20
2. Severance damage to remaining
property --·· ·-·--------------------------·----- $12,487.50
3. Total opinion _____________________________ $54,234.70

d. Cain
1. Land taken ----·--·--· ______________________ $ 6,296.50
2. Severance damage to remaining
property __ ··--- .... ___ ---·-··-·-------____
NONE
3. Total opinion ---------------·------- _______ $ 6,296.50
e. Adams
1. Land taken ------·- ---------·---------- _____ $ 4,277.80
2. Severance damage to remaining
property ______ ·----------····------------·--__ $ 1,685.00
3. Total opinion -----·---------------·--------- $5,962.80
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The jury returned its general verdict in the following amount:
a. Market value of property taken by
the State -------------- ----------------------------- $ 6,296.50
b. Damages, if any, by reason of severance ___________________ ---------------------------- $15,023.50
c. Less benefit accruing, if any, by
reason of construction of the highway
NONE
d. Add net severance __________________________ $15,023.50
e. Total judgment _______________________________ $21,320.00

On motion of appellant for a new trial, the trial
court found that the total amount awarded for severance damages was not justified by the evidence
and was excessive and reduced the amount to $12,487.50. From the judgment entered, the appellant
prosecuted this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.

The trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to grant a new trial. The refusal was conditioned on
respondent's accepting a remittitur in an amount
equal to the highest estimate of severance damages
testified to by any witness. The trial court in denying the new trial found that the verdict for_ sever-

6
ance damages was excessive and not justified by
the evidence.
A study of the record indicates that the jury
award for severance damages was unusually large:
(1) The amount of $15,028.50 for severance damages was $2,536.00 over the highest testimony of
any expert witness; (2) The value of the land taken
as found by the jury was considerably less than
would support their finding as to the diminution in
value of the remaining land; (3) A large portion of
the severance figure in the amount of $8,280.00 was
based on one element, i.e., complete loss of access
(Tr. 35, 67) in which the appellant proved was not
a fact, in that access was available to the remaining
land (Tr. 188. 195) (Ex. P-7) and a portion of the remaining land was landlocked prior to the acquisition by the state (Tr. 52-53). A review of the record
shows that the jury either misunderstood the facts
or was influenced with passion and prejudice.
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed a trial
court on facts similar to the instant case. In Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah
2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial on the condition that
plaintiff accept additurs to the jury's award of severance damages. This court stated on p. 320:
Granting or denying a new trial is largely in the
discretion of the trial court. Here the trial court
clearly indicated that in his opinion the jury verdict
was less than the smalJest amount which the jury
could reasonably award under the evidence by

granting an additur to two defendants. A careful
study of the record before us, (some parts of the
evidence is not before us) indicates that the jury
verdicts were unusually small, suggesting passion
or prejudice or a misunderstanding of the law or
facts presented. Under these circumstances we conclude th'lt the interest of justice requires that this
proceeding be remanded for a new trial as to all
defendants.

It is true that in Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Braegger, 8 Utah 2d 346, 334 P.2d
758 (1959), this court reduced a judgment by jury
when the remittitur represented a figure derived
and identified from the record. On the contrary, in
the instant case, there is nothing in the records to
indicate what the excess over the amount of the
highest testimony on severance damages represented.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
,JURY TO CONSIDER THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT
OF RESPONDENT'S CLOSING STATEMENT IN EXPRESSING AN INCORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

During the course of the trial, respondent's
witness, Mr. J. W. Hammond, testified to the market
data approach along with the income approach in
determining the market value of the subject property (Tr. 68). Over appeJlant's objections, respondent's attorney, in his closing statement, was permitted to argue to the jury that the amount of the income approach should be added to the value already determined by the market data approach
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(Tr. 234). Mr. Hammond testified as follows:
Q. So then if we were to assume that there was a
portion of ground that had an income of $30 per
month and that $30 was, that the property had an
income of $30 per month, then would this fact increase the appraised value that you would place
on that property?

A.

Yes.

Q.

By how much?

A. Of course, depending on where it was, if it were
in the blue, I have already appraised it for more
than that (Tr. 68).

On cross examination, Mr. Hammond explained
further the income approach:
All right. So that is $3,000 for the total operation; right?

Q.

A. $3,000 for the, for whatever acreage was involved, yes. (Tr. 76).

And further:
Q. The more acrease you had in it, the less per
acre?

A.

The less per acre it would be, yes sir.

Q. Right. So as far as you know, it could be $10
per acre?

A. As far as I know, it could be, if that was the
area involved. (Tr. 77).

This court has recently stated that appraisers
commonly use three approaches to values. State v.
Bingham Gas & Oil Company, _____ .Utah 2d .. _______ , 440
P.2d 260 (1968). In The Appraisal of Real Estate, The
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American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 63-64,
(4th ed. 1964), it is stated:
In the majority of his assignments, the appraiser
utilized all three approaches. On occasion, he may
believe the value indication from one approach will
be more significant than from the other two, yet
he will use all three as a check against each and to
test his own judgment.

But in no case does the appraiser add all the
amounts derived from the three approaches together as the attorney attempted to do in his argument
to the jury and in which the jury, because the trial
court so allowed, was free to so consider. The law
is well stated in 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain, § 286 (3)
(1965):
Subject to such reasonable limitations as may be
imposed by the trial court, counsel for litigants in
a jury trial of a condemnation proceeding have the
right to argue the issues raised by the evidence and
the pleadings; but a duty rests on the trial judge
to supervise the scope of such argument and to
limit it to the evidence and to the argument of
opposing counsel, and on argument which. is not
based on the evidence, or states an incorrect measure of damages, or is contrary to the instructions
on the question, is improper.

In Adair v. N. W. Electric Power Cooperative. Inc.,
(Mo. App. 1959) 329 S.W.2d 33, the court held that
argument of counsel in prescribing a measure of
damages other than the difference between the
value before and after the taking was prejudicial
error. In his argument counsel for the property own-
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er asked the jury to consider one dollar a day for 30
years for the easement sought by the condemning
party. The court stated on p. 38:
The ultimate objective is to hold trials that are fair.
The proper and legal rule for measuring damages in
this type of case has been judicially declared many
times. The trial court instructed the jury accordingly. The evidence was confined within such limitations. Then this argument broke through and
over and outside of legal and proper barriers and
adversary objections were denied and overruled.
The argument as made was not based upon any
evidence. It suggested an illegal, improper and incorrect measure of damages and was definitely contrary to the court's instructions. We believe and
hold it was improper, unjustified and when considered in the light of the court's refusal to sustain
the objections thereto, amounted to prejudicial and
reversible error.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE:
A. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR.
KENNETH SILLIMAN. ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS
VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN AND SEVERANCE
DAMAGES WAS MORE THAN THE TOTAL BEFORE
VALUE.
B. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR.
CARL J. LEAVITT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE DID
NOT VALUE THE PROPERTY AT ITS FAIR MARKET
VALUE NOR AS OF THE DATE OF TAKING.
C. THE OPINION OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MR.
J. W. HAMMOND, ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE RECOGNIZED SPECIAL BENEFITS BUT DID NOT DEDUCT SAME FROM HIS SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
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Respondent's witnesses were familiar with land
values and were allowed to so testify. Although the
limited experience of a witness goes to the weight
of his testimony, Provo River Water Users' Ass'n. v.
Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943), it is appellant's cont8ntion that an expert's opinion based on
an improper approach can not be of benefit to a
jury and should not be considered by them in determining the amount of damages.
Generally, the law is stated in 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 18.42(1), (3rd ed. 1962), at 248-9, as
follows:
While consideration of certain speculative possibilities is not fatal (citing case) an opinion based
on purely speculative use (citing cases) or on an
erroneous standard of value (citing cases) Will be
rejected. The same rule of exclusion applies also
to legally non-cognizable elements of damage. This
is an implicit exception to the willing seller--willing
buyer concept of market value. Though it is true
that such participants in a voluntary sale may give
consideration to elements which unquestionably
have a depreciating effect upon value, if an element
is damnum absque injurea no consideration may be
given thereto. As one court said: (citing case)
"Opinions of witnesses based upon supposed elements of damage which were not recognized by law
as proper to be considered in condemnation proceedings should have been excluded. Only such
opinions as are based on evidence of lawful ele- ·
men ts of damages can be of benefit to a jury in the
assessment of the amount of damage."

With the above announced rule in mind, appellant made objections to the testimony of respond-

12
ent's three value witnesses. The objections will be
taken up separately as follows:
A. On cross examination, Mr. Kenneth Silliman, respondent's first value witness was asked for
a before value.
Q. I want to know if you have an opinion as to
the total amount; yes.

A.

I did, prior to the taking by the state, yes.

Q.

And what was that opinion?

A.

I-approximately $50,000. (Tr. 42).

The above testimony took place on the first day of
trial and without the benefit of compiling 15 separate items of value to which Mr. Silliman testified
to. It is noted that a tota 1 before and after value was
never testified. to on direct examination by Mr. Silliman. Without calculating the areas and their values
themselves, the jury or the court were not aware
of Mr. Silliman' s values for the land taken and severance damages.
This court has stated that the measure of compensation when part of a tract is taken is the difference between the fair market value of the whole
tract before the taking and the fair market value of
what remains after the taking. Salt Lake Coun.ty Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, 11 Utah 2d 232,
357 P.2d 486 (1960); State v. Ward. 112 Utah 452, 189
P.2d 113 (1.948); State v. Cooperative Security Corporation, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952). It has to
be conceded that the sum of all its parts can not ex-
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ceed the whole. The opinion of Mr. Silliman led the
jury to believe that although the entire subject property was valued at $50,000 immediately prior to the
take, the value of part of the tract and severance
damages would be $65,656.70. From his testimony,
it is evident that his opinion contained legally noncognizable elements of damage. Assuming that there
was 100 % damage to the remaining land, the most
the jury should have been allowed to consider in
their deliberation was $50,000.
B. Respondent's expert witness, l\.1r. Carl J.
Leavitt, did not value the subject property as of the
date of taking and did not appraise the subject
property at its fair market value. It is well settled in
this state that the measure of damages is just com·pensation and just compensation is the market value
of the property taken. Southern Pacific Company v.
Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960). Market
value is defined as the amount of money which a
purchaser willing, but not obliged to buy the property, would pay to an owner, willing but not obliged
to sell it. Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10
Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960); State v. Noble, 6 ··.
Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957), Mr. Leavitt was asked ·
to define fair market value:
A. Well, fair market value. The market is so un- .
stable now, who knows what the fair market value
is. Let me put it that way to you.

Q.

Is that your answer?

A.

That is my answer. (Tr. 101).
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The basis of his opinion was brought out as follows:
Q. And what you are saying then as to these
values you placed on the subject property is what a
willing buyer who purchased the property-

A. If there were a willing buyer and a willing seller
why you would have a, you would have a good
transaction. I have an opinion on the property of
my own that whether it is of any value to you or
not but-and to my way of thinking on placing a
valuation on it people that hoJd prop~rty for 25 to
30 years certainly have some idea of some time expecting a value out of it. And if it is indicative that
there is coming one they don't like to be forced.
(Tr. 97).

* *

*

Q. But when you say they have been forced to
give up their property, what you are telling us then
is the state ought to pay more for the property
than it would, than a willing buyer would pay?

A. When I say forced, I mean it from this standpoint, that who is to say that it might not be worth
ten times that ten years from now.
Q. Well, I think that is why you are on the stand,
Mr. Hammond, or Mr. Leavitt.

A. The point I am getting at is being forced at a
point now rather than a later date when it might be
more valuable. (Tr. 98).

It is obvious that Mr. Leavitt did not use a willing
buyer-willing seller concept in his appraisal of the
subject property, nor did he appraise the subject
property at the date of the taking by the appellant.
It is clear in Mr. Leavitt's testimony that he valued
the subject property with an element of future speculative value. By statute it is provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-11 (1953):

15
For the purpose of assessing compensation and
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and
its actual value at that date shall be the measure
of compensation for all property to be actuallv
taken, and the basis of damages to property not
actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the
next preceding section ....

By Mr. Leavitt's own admission, he did not assess
compensation at the date of taking:
Q. You have arrived at a conclusion as to the
value of the land-

A. We looked at the map and we arrived at that
conclusion that Mr. Hammond gave you. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you relate that value at that time to
any date when the property was acquired by the
state?

A. Well, probably not. I didn't. I don't look at it
from that standpoint. It is what it is worth now,
not yesterday. (Tr. 99).

It is conceded that an expert can take into account
potential development in the area, Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District v. Ward. 10 Utah 2d 29,
347 P.2d 862 (1959), but nowhere does any jurisdiction allow just compensation to be assessed on the .
theory expressed by Mr. Leavitt.
C. Besides the issues of value of land taken
and severance damages to the remaining land, the
issue of benefits was tried. The state's expert witness, Mr. Memory Cain, testified that any severance
damages to the remaining tract was offset by the
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benefit derived from the highway improvement.
(Tr. 122). Before the acquisition, the property which
received the benefit was grazing land. (Tr. 119-120).
After the acquisition, the highest and best use of the
same property became commercial. (Tr. 122).
By statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1953)
benefits may be set off from damages to the remaining land. In Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Butterfield, 46
Utah 431, 150 Pac. 931 (1915) the court restricted the
application of the statute by limiting the type of
benefits which could be deducted. The benefit in
the instant case was not one which merely increased the traffic flow but enhanced the market
value immediately by improving its adaptability for
a higher and better use. Petkus v. State Highway
Commission, 24 Wis.2d 643, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964).
Respondent's expert witness, Mr. J. W. Hammond, admitted that there was a benefit to the remaining land but did not offset the benefits from the
severance damage. (Tr. 88-9).
POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
ASSIGNED IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S
CASE AND REQUIRES A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT.

Assuming that standing alone each of the errors
assigned were harmless, the cumulative effect of
the errors substantially prejudiced the interest of
appellant and materially caused the rendition of an
erroneous judgment. It has been held that errors
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occurring in a trial when considered together disclose that the party did not have a fair trial, a reversal of the judgment is proper. State v. Bloomfield
Tractor Sales, Inc., (Mo. App. 1964), 381 S.W.2d 20;
State v. Parkey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 295 S.V;- 2d
457. In the latter case the court stated at p. 462:
There may be some doubt as to whether each of the
four errors above discussed was of such prejudicia~
effect in and of itself as to constitute reversible
error. But we are constrained to hold that the
cumulative effect of such errors was undoubtedly
such as to require a reversal of the judgment appealed from.

CONCLUSION
A discussion of the points in this brief and a review of the record clearly indicates that the errors
assigned, taken together or alone, require a reversal
of the judgment.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion
for a new trial and that respondent's argument to
the jury that income from the property could be considered by them as a separate item of damage was
prejudicial error. Appellant urges that the measure
of damages is a matter not to be argued to the jury,
but that the trial court should limit the measure of
damages according to the law. The same rule should
have been applied to the witnesses testifying to
value. Once a witness has shown that he is familiar
with the land value in the area of the acquisition,
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the fact that he has limited qualifications or experience goes to the weight rather than to its admissibility. In this regard, appellant makes no issue. But
when expressing his opinion, the witness must follow and apply legal standards and acceptable basic
principales of real property evaluation. If the witness in arriving at his value conclusions, has incorrectly used a wrong approach to value, or included
non-compensable elements of damages, or penalized the condemning agency for forcing the acquisition, or created a windfall in favor of the property
owner, the opinion should not be considered by the
jury at all in assessing compensation.
In view of the testimony of the witnesses and
the rulings of the tria] court, it is unlikely that the
jury, in their deliberation and in arriving at an excess verdict, had before them a correct measure of
damages to guide them.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
TOM G. PLATIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

